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HORIZONTAL INNOVATION AND  
INTERFACE PATENTS 
 
Bernard Chao 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Scholars understandably devote a great deal of effort to studying how 
well patent law works to incentive the most important inventions. After all, 
these inventions form the foundation of our new technological age. But very 
little time is spent focusing on the other end of the spectrum, inventions that 
are no better than what the public already has. At first blush, studying such 
“horizontal” innovation seems pointless. But this inquiry actually reveals 
much about how patents can be used in unintended, and arguably, 
anticompetitive ways. 
This issue has roots in one unintuitive aspect of patent law. Despite the 
law’s goal of promoting innovation, patents can be obtained on inventions 
that are no better than existing technology. Such patents might appear 
worthless, but companies regularly obtain these patents to cover interfaces. 
That is because interface patents actually derive value from two distinct 
characteristics. First, they can have “innovation value” that is based on how 
much better the patented interface is than existing technology. Second, 
interface patents can also have “compatibility value.” In other words, the 
patented technology is often essential to make products operate (i.e. 
compatible) with a particular interface. In practical terms, this means that an 
interface patent that covers little or no meaningful advance can give a 
company the ability to extract rents and foreclose competition.  
This undesirable result is a consequence of how patent law has 
structured its remedies. For years patent law has implicitly awarded both 
innovation and compatibility values. Recently, the courts have taken a 
sensible first step and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty 
recoveries for standard essential patents. This Article argues that the law 
needs to go further and do the same for all essential interface patents.  
Additionally, patent law should reform the way it awards injunctions and 
lost profits to also exclude compatibility value. This proposal has two 
benefits. It would eliminate the incentives for wasteful patents on horizontal 
technology. Second, and more importantly, the value of all interface patents 
would be better aligned with the goals of the patent system. 
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HORIZONTAL INNOVATION AND  
INTERFACE PATENTS 
 
Bernard Chao* 
 
“. . . the framers of the patent system did not require an inventor to 
demonstrate an invention's superiority to existing products in 
order to qualify for a patent.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars understandably devote a great deal of effort to studying how 
well patent law works to incentive the most important inventions. After all, 
these inventions form the foundation of our new technological age. But very 
little time is spent focusing on the other end of the spectrum, inventions that 
are no better than what the public already has. At first blush, studying such 
“horizontal” innovation seems pointless. But this inquiry actually reveals 
much about how patents can be used in unintended, and arguably, 
anticompetitive ways. 
This issue has roots in one unintuitive aspect of patent law. Despite the 
law’s goal of promoting innovation, patents can be obtained on inventions 
that are no better than existing technology. Such patents might appear 
worthless, but companies regularly obtain these patents to cover interfaces. 
That is because interface patents actually derive value from two distinct 
characteristics. First, they can have “innovation value” that is based on how 
much better the patented interface is than existing technology. Second, 
interface patents can also have “compatibility value.” In other words, the 
patented technology is often essential to make products operate (i.e. 
compatible) with a particular interface. In practical terms, this means that an 
interface patent that covers little or no meaningful advance can give a 
company the ability to extract rents and foreclose competition.  
This undesirable result is a consequence of how patent law has 
structured its remedies. For years patent law has implicitly awarded both 
innovation and compatibility values. Recently, the courts have taken a 
                                                 
* Bernard Chao is an associate professor at the University of Denver, Sturm College of 
Law. Thanks to Frederico Cheever, Kristelia Garcia, Cynthia Ho, Brian Love, David 
McGowan, Viva Moffat, Justin Pidot, Michael Siebecker, Harry Surden, Phil Weiser and 
the participants of the Patent Law Conference at the University Of San Diego School of 
Law (2015), Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Stanford Law School (2012) for 
advancing my thinking on this paper.  
1 Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
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sensible first step and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty 
recoveries for standard essential patents. This Article argues that the law 
needs to go further and do the same for all essential interface patents.  
Additionally, patent law should reform the way it awards injunctions and 
lost profits to also exclude compatibility value. This proposal has two 
benefits. It would eliminate the incentives for wasteful patents on horizontal 
technology. Second, and more importantly, the value of all interface patents 
would be better aligned with the goals of the patent system. 
Part I examines the odd rule that allows patents to be obtained on 
inventions that are no better than existing technology. The U.S. Constitution 
and long established case law both say that the underlying goal of the patent 
system is one of maximizing innovation, and not rewarding individuals. 
Indeed, the different statutory patentability requirements confirm this basic 
notion. Nevertheless, none of the different patent statutes require better and 
the courts have specifically rejected this very idea. This has opened the door 
for patents that do not cover true technical advances. 
Using three real world examples, Part II explains that the “better” 
loophole is not just a theoretical concern. Companies obtain patents on 
horizontal innovation and use them to foreclose competition. First, Part II 
discusses the patented Gillette razor/handle interfaces of the Mach 3 and 
Fusion shaving systems. These interfaces did not cover any improvement in 
the technology of connecting razor to handles. But they did foreclose 
competition in the market for razors that connect to Gillette handles.     
Next, Part II describes the case of patent holdup associated with the 
NWay Ethernet auto-negotiation protocol. Because this simple technology 
was included in the ubiquitous Ethernet 802.3 standard, the company that 
purchased the underlying patents was able to holdup an entire industry. The 
NWay example helps make two points. First, it demonstrates that horizontal 
innovation exists in technology far more complex than razors and handles. 
Today’s technical standards inevitably require some form of interface and 
companies obtain standards essential patents to control these platforms. 
Second, the NWay story illustrates the enormous value this form of 
interface patent can have even when it only covers horizontal innovation. 
Part II concludes by describing the interface used by the latest 
generation of iPhones and iPads, Apple’s patented Lightning interface. By 
focusing on patents that cover purely horizontal technology, the previous 
examples helped isolate the “compatibility value” that such patents have. 
But the Lightning patents cover a real advance, albeit a small one. In 
addition to providing access to products that use their interface, such patents 
derive value from the technological advances the patents contribute. The 
Lightning example illustrates how an interface patent that covers a modest 
advance still gives the patentee disproportionate power to the close the 
3-Feb-16] Horizontal Innovation 5 
platform that uses its interface.  
Part III addresses two different lines of relevant thinking that are based 
on “competition values” and “patent values” respectively.  The competition 
value literature focuses on the role that interface patents play in the 
development of technical standards. But for the most part, such works treat 
patents monolithically. They assume each patent contributes the same fixed, 
but unmeasurable sized advance.  In contrast, the patent values literature 
proposes reforms that depend on the particular contribution a patent makes. 
However, they don’t talk specifically about interface and standards. Rather 
they assume that patents cover true advances. In contrast, this article 
examines how interface patents are currently valuable above and apart from 
any advance they cover. It also explains how this situation is not consistent 
with patent goals. 
Part IV returns to the doctrinal world and explains how patent remedies 
have implicitly awarded both innovation and compatibility value over the 
years. However, at the end 2014, the Federal Circuit took a step in the right 
direction and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty 
recoveries.2 This Article argues that patent law should extend this rule to all 
essential interface patents regardless of whether they are part of a formal 
standard. In addition, patent law should also exclude compatibility value 
from the way it awards injunctions and lost profits. This requires 
eliminating both injunctions and lost profits for all necessary interface 
patents. Instead the law should only award reasonable royalties that are 
calibrated to the magnitude of the patent’s contribution above and beyond 
the prior art while specifically informing any fact finder that they must 
exclude compatibility value. 
Having explained how patent law should deal with interface patents, 
Part V takes a brief look at the larger picture and notes that interface patents 
are actually just one of five different tactics companies use to tie products 
together and foreclose competition. Oddly, these tactics are governed by 
different substantive laws – namely patent, antitrust law, traditional 
copyright law and the DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act). The 
result is a hodgepodge of different standards and values. Part V does not 
attempt to reconcile these different laws. Rather, it suggests that further 
work needs to be done to make the larger picture cohesive. 
  
I. THE “BETTER” LOOPHOLE 
 
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to enact laws that 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
                                                 
2 See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text. 
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”3 The Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on 
this clause to declare that the fundamental purpose of patent law is to 
promote innovation. To the extent that inventors receive financial rewards, 
it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation.4 Patent law implements 
its innovation goal through a number of different requirements found in 
Sections 101, 102, 103 and 112 of the patent laws. I review these statutes in 
brief to show how they seek to promote innovation.  Notably, these 
requirements are merely innovation proxies. None of these statutes actually 
require that a patented invention fulfill the Constitutional mandate of 
promoting the progress of science.  
Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject matter 
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”5 The courts have 
interpreted § 101 to contain two distinct requirements.6  Inventions must 
relate to subject matter that is eligible for patent protection and inventions 
must have utility. Both these requirements are aimed at promoting 
innovation.  
The subject matter patent eligibility requirement prevents would be 
inventors from obtaining patents on basic laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.7 The doctrine has been in a considerable 
flux with the Supreme Court recently issuing controversial opinions on the 
eligibility of medical diagnostic, biotechnology and software patents.8 
Although these decisions have been roundly criticized as lacking coherence, 
the purpose of the doctrine remains clear.9 The goal of the subject matter 
patent eligibility requirement is to ensure that patents do not place too large 
                                                 
3 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to make laws 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  
4 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent 
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. 
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
6 Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents, 165 (3rd Ed. 2014). 
7 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
8 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013); 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l et al., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014). 
9 See e.g., Robert Merges, Go ask Alice - what can you patent after Alice v. CLS 
Bank?, (Jun. 20, 2014) (explaining the difficulty of applying the Court’s  new two step 
subject matter eligibility test) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-
go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/; Bernard Chao, Moderating 
Mayo, 107 NW. U L. REV. 423 (2012) (discussing the reaction to Mayo).  
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a burden on later innovation.10 The Supreme Court has characterized the 
underlying concern as one of “pre-emption” and said that monopolizing the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work “might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”11 
Section 101 also requires utility. The Supreme Court has said that until 
an invention has been refined to the point where it has utility, there is 
insufficient justification for issuing a patent.12 Such a patent may turn out to 
cover a “broad field,”13 and presumably, hamstring later innovators. In 
practice, utility has three prongs: (1) operability (2) substantial utility and 
(3) specific utility.14 Each of these prongs must be satisfied to satisfy the 
utility requirement.   
Operability requires that an invention actually achieve its intended 
result.15  Substantial utility focuses on whether the invention has “enough” 
utility. In other words, the patent application “must show that an invention 
is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove 
useful at some future date after further research.”16 Specific utility requires 
that an invention “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to the 
public.”17 The purpose of this requirement is to deny patents for inventions 
where the asserted use is “so vague as to be meaningless.”18 Together the 
different prongs of the utility requirement are intended to limit patents to 
those inventions that provide actual and specific benefits to society without 
placing too large a burden on downstream innovation.19  
Sections 102 and 103 require novelty and non-obviousness 
respectively.20 A person is not entitled to a patent unless her invention was 
novel.  Novelty ensures that the invention is new and prevents anyone from 
obtaining a patent on knowledge that the public already possesses.21 Section 
                                                 
10 Mayo, supra, 132 S.Ct.at 1293. (“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant 
of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”  
11 Alice, supra, 134 S.Ct at 2358.  But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About 
Preemption, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 563 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reliance on a 
preemption justification distracts from the real policy issues underlying the subject matter 
patent eligibility debate). 
12 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966). 
13 Id. 
14 Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV 1046, 1066 (2014).  
15 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual Of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107.01 
(9th ed. rev. 2014).  
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
19 Seymore, supra note 14 at 1065. Seymore argues that utility has not been applied in 
manner that serves these goals. Id. at 1076 . 
20 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103. 
21 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989) 
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103 builds on section 102’s novelty requirement by saying that even if the 
invention is novel, the person is not entitled to patent if the invention was 
somehow obvious. Non-obviousness denies patents to trivial variations of 
current technology because such inventions presumably would have come 
about through ordinary technological progress.22 
Finally, Section 112 discusses what information the written description 
(also called the specification) of a patent must contain. Three distinct 
doctrines grow out of § 112. They are known as the definiteness, 
enablement and written description requirements.  A patent is invalid for 
indefiniteness if its claims fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those 
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.23 Unclear claims burden 
innovation in several ways.24  Companies may end up foregoing technology 
that is not actually covered by a patent. Alternatively, they may pay for 
licenses they don’t need. Even when these kinds of problems don’t occur, 
there are substantial transactions costs associated with trying to identify the 
contours of unclear claims. The definiteness requirement attempts to reduce 
all these costs by incentivizing inventors to draft clearer patent claims.25   
Section 112 also requires that a patent enable the claimed invention. To 
satisfy this requirement, the specification must describe “the manner and 
process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use . . . the 
invention.”26  This requirement is satisfied when a person of ordinary skill 
in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed 
invention without undue experimentation.27  The enablement requirement 
                                                                                                                            
(noting that Thomas Jefferson believed that “a grant of patent rights in an idea already 
disclosed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law, ‘obstruct[[ing] others in the use of 
what they possessed before”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326, 327 
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., Library ed. 1904))); Curtis, supra note 
39, §378. 
22 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); see also Bonito Boats, 489 
U.S. at 151, 156 (stating that nonobviousness standard provides “a careful balance between 
the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through 
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive 
economy”). 
23 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). 
24 See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV 1359, 1372-
75 (2014) (providing a more thorough discussion of the problems of unclear patent 
boundaries). 
25 Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124. 
26 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
27 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (“Enablement . . . is not precluded even if some experimentation is necessary, 
although the amount of experimentation needed must not be unduly extensive . . . .”). 
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serves two functions both of which are tied to innovation.  First, by 
requiring the inventor to inform the public how to practice the invention, § 
112 encourages the dissemination of ideas. Second, by constraining the 
permissible scope of claims, § 112 prevents a patent from placing too large 
a burden on downstream innovation.28 
Like the enablement requirement, the written description requirement is 
rooted in 35 U.S.C § 112. The relevant passage says that “[t]he specification 
shall contain a written description of the invention.”29 To satisfy the written 
description requirement, the specification “must clearly allow persons of 
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is 
claimed.”30  In other words, the written description requirement guards 
against claims that depart too far from the invention actually found in the 
specification. Again, this preserves incentives for later innovation. 
Despite the numerous statutory requirements, there is no patent statute 
that expressly requires that an invention must somehow be “better” than 
what was done before. Only § 101’s utility doctrine contains any hint that 
patents must cover inventions that improve on existing technology.  It’s not 
hard to imagine how the substantial and specific utility requirements might 
evolve to also require that inventions be better than the prior art.  After all, 
an invention that does not improve on technology does not seem to have 
any real use.  
But the Supreme Court rejected precisely this expansion of the utility 
requirement in 1817. In Bedford v. Hunt, Justice Story said that “[i]t is not 
necessary to establish, that the invention is of such general utility, as to 
supersede all other inventions now in practice to accomplish the same 
purpose . . .  The law does not look to the degree of utility.”31 Story’s view 
persists to this day. Recently, the Federal Circuit has said that “[a]n 
invention need not be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain result 
. . .”32 In fact, an invention that is “less effective than existing devices” can 
still satisfy “the statutory criteria for patentability.”33 These decisions 
                                                 
28 Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the 
New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 at ¶¶ 57-58, available at 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf.  
29 35 U.S.C § 112(a). 
30 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 
(Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31 Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).  
32 See Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991); See also, 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“to meet patent law's usefulness requirement, a product need not be better than other 
alternatives or essential to competition.”; Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 4.01 
(2015). 
33 Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12 (Fed. 
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demonstrate that patent law does not require that patents be “better” than the 
prior art. In Part II, this Article describes how companies take advantage of 
this innovation loophole to prevent others from making compatible products 
and close standards. 
 
II. HORIZONTAL INNOVATIONS 
 
Despite the fact that patent law does not require “better”, market forces 
typically would counsel companies to only patent inventions that advance 
technology. After all why would anyone waste their time and money 
patenting inventions that are slower, less efficient or otherwise worse than 
what was done before? Unfortunately, there are areas where the other 
incentives exist. Specifically, companies regularly seek to obtain a patent 
just to control an interface.34 Whether the underlying technology is better, 
may not matter. 35 A company using this tactic is simply trying to control 
competition in the market for complementary products.  
For the purposes of this article, I will refer to inventions that do not 
improve on prior technology, as “horizontal innovation.” Because my focus 
is on questionable patents, this article only uses the term to refer to 
inventions that satisfy the existing statutory requirements discussed above. 
Of course, horizontal innovation is far less beneficial than innovation that 
advances technology. Indeed, some may question whether the term 
“innovation” is even appropriate for an invention that does nothing better 
than what society already possesses. But horizontal innovation still requires 
an odd kind of ingenuity. Inventors must make a new and non-obvious (i.e. 
satisfy §§ 102 and 103) interface to obtain a patent. In practice, that often 
means that inventors add unnecessary and arbitrary complexity to their 
invention.36 The sole purpose underlying these technical bells and whistles 
is to justify a patent by showing the patent office that the invention is 
sufficiently different from the prior art – or in patent terms, not obvious. 
In the following subsections, I establish that the “better loophole” is 
                                                                                                                            
Cir. 1986). 
34 Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1943, 1962  (2008) (suggesting that the ability to control a platform is a more 
“powerful reason” for obtaining an interface patent than recouping investment in the 
technology).  
35 Maureen O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1177, 1218 (2000)(suggesting that some interfaces have low intrinsic value, but 
O’Rourke does not suggest that they may have no intrinsic value). 
36 Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1963 (discussing how some patented interfaces are 
arbitrary variations of existing techniques). See also e.g. infra note 37 to 45 and 
accompanying text describing the patented Gillette interfaces and note 74 (discussing the 
patented escape code sequence of the Hayes smart modem).   
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more than just a theoretical concern. The examples below demonstrate that 
real world companies do obtain interface patents on horizontal innovation. 
Moreover, these patents give their owners the ability to control the market 
for complementary goods and even close platforms.    
 
A.  Razors and Handles 
 
Consider U.S. Patent No. 5,787,586 (“the ‘586 patent”) which covers 
the Gillette Mach 3 Razor interface. The patent describes a shaving system 
with replaceable cartridges. The features necessary to connect the cartridge 
with the handle are intricate. A cropped version of figure 2 is depicted to the 
left below. It shows how the handle and cartridge connect.37 These 
components mate with trapezoidal shaped recess at the bottom of the razor 
and are claimed by the patent.38 Thus, it is not surprising that the patent 
satisfied the novelty and non-obviousness requirements.39 There was 
probably nothing like this particular interconnection mechanism in the prior 
art.  It is also clear that the claimed invention satisfies Section 101’s utility 
requirement and Section 112’s written description and enablement 
requirements. The combination of components serves some use and ‘586 
patent specification clearly provides sufficient detail.  
Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that prior methods of connecting 
razors and handles were somehow lacking. Indeed, it would be surprising if 
the shaving industry was unable to make a solid connection by the mid-
1990’s when the Mach 3 patents were filed.  Moreover, there is also no 
indication that this invention is somehow better than what was done before. 
Although not required, the specifications of many patents explain why the 
claimed invention improves on existing technology. Nothing of the sort is 
found in the ‘586 patent.   
A patent on a subsequent Gillette shaving system, the Gillette Fusion, 
                                                 
37 The handle contains a spring based plunger, u-shaped ejector and “ejector” button 
‘586 patent at col. 5, lines 58-60 and col. 7, lines 52-57. 
38 Claim 1 is representative and states: A razor comprising 
a replaceable shaving cartridge including a pivotal housing and an interconnect 
member, 
said housing carrying one or more blades, a guard, and a cap, and having a camming 
surface, 
said interconnect member having a pivotal support structure that pivotally supports 
said housing for pivoting about a pivot axis and a central base structure having a recess and 
an opening from said recess facing said camming surface, and 
a handle having a cartridge support structure shaped to mate with said recess and a 
spring biased plunger that has a cam follower surface and extends from said cartridge 
support structure and through said opening to act on said camming surface to bias said 
housing.  
39  Section 102 and 103. 
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provides additional evidence of horizontal innovation. The Fusion also has 
another new and different patented interface.40 Although the Fusion patent 
identifies “advantages”, these advantages do not appear to represent 
improvements over the Mach 3 interface. For example, the first supposed 
advantage is that the “connection . . . can secure the cartridge to the handle 
for use during a trimming operation . . .” However, the earlier Mach 3 
interface performs the same function for that system.41 One commentator 
has suggested that the key improvement over the Mach 3 was “the space 
between the blades . . . and the number of blades [five instead of three]”, 
features that have nothing to do with the manner in which the cartridges 
connect to the handle.42 A physical inspection of both systems also fails to 
identify any improvement in the Fusion interface.43 Both handles connect to 
the cartridges in a surprisingly similar way. The cartridges fit on a spring 
biased plunger and are released by an ejector button found on the respective 
handles44 At least superficially, the primary difference between the two 
interfaces is that the plunger in the Mach 3 runs parallel to the main body of 
the handle interface while the Fusion’s plunger runs perpendicular to the 
corresponding structure in that handle. Nonetheless, Gillette still obtained 
three patent families that covered the handle and its connection to the 
cartridge.45  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 See e.g. U.S. Patent No. 7,168,173 entitled “Shaving System.”  
41 The other listed advantages are: “[t]he connecting member can be easily disengaged 
from the handle by actuating the release button, which causes the pusher to engage the 
connecting member. Increasing s cing of the contact point between the plunger and the 
housing from the pivot axis tends to provide leverage for biasing the blade unit toward its 
rest, spring-biased position.” ‘173 patent at 2: 67-3:5. 
42 Christian Sternitzke, Interlocking patent rights and modularity: Insights from the 
Gillette Fusion, p. 12, DRUID (2012).  
43 I have purchased both systems and compared them. 
44 The plungers are labeled as 44 in ‘586 patent and 134 in the ‘173 patent while the 
ejector buttons are labeled 50 in the ‘586 patent and 196 in the ‘173 patent.   
45 Id. at 9, 13. 
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Mach 3 Interface Patent  
Fusion Interface Patent 
 
The likely purpose of such patents was to enable Gillette to prevent 
competitors from making razors that operate with Gillette handles.46 In 
other words, Gillette has used patent law to effectively tie the sale of its 
razor to the sale of its handles. Now some competition law scholars argue 
that this tie is harmless. Competitors can make their own razor/handle 
combinations thereby preventing Gillette from extracting monopoly rents 
from its razor sales.47 Yet, Gillette’s high profit margins suggest this view 
may not paint an entirely accurate picture.48 Perhaps, Gillette’s ability to 
charge high prices it due to brand recognition.  But Gillette is certainly not 
relying on that advantage. It obtains patents on its interfaces, and there do 
not appear to be any competitors openly selling Gillette compatible razors 
in the United States.   
But the point of this example is not to engage in the debate about 
whether or not Gillette’s interface patents allow it to obtain monopoly 
rents.49 Rather the example is intended to show that companies are 
sufficiently motivated to obtain interface patents on technology that does 
not advance innovation in any way. That means that society is not receiving 
anything of technological value when it grants patents on these kinds of 
interfaces. By contrast, the patents certainly give their owners something of 
value. They effectively act as “patent ties.” Such patents give their owners 
the right to prevent other companies from using the interface. Consumers 
                                                 
46 Mark Blaxill and Ralph Eckardt, The Invisible Edge: Taking Your Strategy to the 
Next Level Using Intellectual Property, p. 144 (2009) (discussing how some Fusion patents 
“prevent third-party cartridge makers from selling knockoff cartridges.”)   
47 Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (2011) 
(“Standard economics suggests that a firm playing razors-and-blades will face entry into 
the blades business and that entry will destroy the possibility of subsidizing handles with 
expensive blades.”); see also Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 
(2006)(“Many tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties, are 
fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”) 
48 The Forbes website lists Gillette as the world’s 27th most valuable brand saying: 
“Razors are one of the most profitable businesses for P&G with operating margins of 32%. 
Procter & Gamble controls 70% of the global blades and razors market led by Gillette.”) 
available at http://www.forbes.com/companies/gillette/ (last checked February 16, 2015).  
49 The debate over the competitive effects of tying continue to this day.  See infra note 
168 and accompanying text and compare Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the 
Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400 (2009) (arguing 
that critics of tying make several restrictive and unwarranted assumptions); Erik 
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangement and Antitrust Harm, 52 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 925, 928 (201) (disagreeing with Elhauge and suggesting that tying that results in 
metering only harms competition “in the most flagrant situations”, and they it often 
increases welfare). 
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must purchase complementary products from the patent owner or its 
licensees.  Thus, Gillette’s interface patents are valuable because they have 
“compatibility value”; they allow it to control who does and does not make 
razors that operate with Gillette’s handles. Importantly, an interface patent 
can have compatibility value even when it only covers horizontal 
innovation. 
 
B.  Fast Handshakes 
 
The problem of horizontal innovation is not limited to just basic 
mechanical devices like the Gillette razor. For example, one aspect of 
today’s technical standards is their interface. Technology companies can use 
patents on horizontal technology to close a platform and control the market 
for hardware and software that operate on that interface. 
The story of National Semiconductor’s (“National”) NWay auto-
negotiation technology provides a good example of this situation.  In the 
early 90’s, the IEEE 802.3 Working Group was developing a new “Fast 
Ethernet” standard that would allow equipment to transmit at 100 Mbps 
over copper wire.50 Fast Ethernet needed to be backwards compatible so 
that new equipment could continue to communicate with the existing 
installed base. That meant that the new standard needed to include some 
form of auto-negotiation technology that would allow different types of 
equipment to “negotiate” how they would transmit data (i.e. say what mode 
they were using). The 802.3 Working Group considered several alternative 
technologies including National’s Nay technology.51  
At its core, the NWay technology is surprisingly simple. Earlier local 
area networks used the Ethernet communication protocol. One flavor of 
Ethernet (10Base-T or twisted pair) would issue a “link test pulse” to 
determine the presence of compatible equipment at the other end of the link.  
The link test pulse was a very short pulse with a 16 millisecond interval. 
Figure 10A from U.S. Patent No. 5,617,418, one of National’s NWay 
patents, depicts the timing of the link test pulse (below).52   
                                                 
50 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) is a standard-setting 
organization. IEEE standards include the prominent 802 series (e.g. WIFI and Ethernet 
standards) which are designed to enhance the interoperability of communications products.  
51 Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094, Complaint ¶ 11 (Jan. 23, 2008) 
(hereinafter “FTC Negotiated Data Complaint”). 
52 This was simply one patent in larger family of NWay patents.  
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National’s NWay technology added “fast link pulses” to help different 
devices determine which technology they would use to communicate. Fast 
link pulses differed from the previous link test pulse because they occurred 
in bursts, not singly. Those pulses are depicted in Figure 10B (immediately 
below Figure 10A). A new device would recognize the fast link pulse and 
interpret that to mean that the device at other end of the link could 
communicate using the new faster technology. The device would respond in 
kind sending its own fast link pulses. Such a negotiation told both devices 
to communicate using the newer technology. In contrast, an old device 
knew nothing of fast link pulses.  When such devices received fast link 
pulses, they would only notice the first pulse in series of fast link pulses and 
interpret the signal to be the old link test pulse. The older device would 
respond in the only way it knew how sending the link test pulse. The newer 
device would interpret a link test pulse signal to mean that it was 
communicating with an older device that could only use the slower 
technology.  
National committed to licensing NWay for one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) in the event that the IEEE included NWay into the standard.53 
Subsequently the IEEE adopted a Fast Ethernet standard with an 
autodetection feature based upon the NWay technology. After the adoptions 
of the standard, manufacturers incorporated the Fast Ethernet standard with 
the NWay technology into billions of dollars of computer devices such as 
personal computers, switches, routers, DSL and cable modems, wireless 
LAN access points, IP phones, and other equipment.54 By 2001, the FTC 
                                                 
53  Decision and Order, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (FTC, Sept. 9, 
200S), FTC File No. 051-0094, Attachment A to Appendix C (Letter dated June 7, 1994 
from Mark Grant, Director of Intellectual Property, National Semiconductor Corp. to 
Geoffrey Thompson, Chair, S02.3 Working Group, IEEE) (hereinafter "N-Data FTC 
Decision”).  
54 M. Sean Royall and Adam J. Di Vincenzo, The FTC's N-Data Consent Order: A 
Missed Opportunity to Clarify Antitrust in Standard Setting, Antitrust, Summer 2008, at 
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said that there was no commercially viable alternative auto-negotiation 
technology for Ethernet.55 At the same time, many of these manufacturers 
did not bother to formally accept National’s offer and pay the nominal fee. 
This omission provided an opportunity for the subsequent owners of the 
NWay patents.  
For four years, National did nothing to enforce the NWay patents. 
Eventually, National assigned the NWay patents to Vertical Networks, a 
corporate spin-off.56 In 2002, after Fast Ethernet and a successor standard 
known as “Gigabit Ethernet” had taken firm root, Vertical Networks, the 
new owner of the NWay patents, retracted the prior $1,000 licensing 
commitment and began seeking licenses in the neighborhood of ten cents 
per Ethernet port.57 Given the billions of dollars of Fast Ethernet equipment 
(e.g. hubs, routers, switches, modems) in place at the time and the rate at 
which new equipment was continuing to be sold, Vertical Network’s royalty 
demands were enormous.   
These tactics triggered a FTC investigation that resulted in a consent 
degree that required Vertical Networks to honor the original $1,000 offer 
made by National.58 So for most attorneys, Vertical Networks stands as a 
cautionary tale against reneging on standards commitments.59 But this story 
also helps us understand that the lessons about horizontal technology are 
limited to simple world of mechanical interface, they apply equally well to 
the high tech industry and standards essential patents.  
The NWay auto-negotiation technology represents another example of 
horizontal innovation – technology that was no better than existing 
alternatives. Both the nature of the technology and its original $1,000 fee 
suggest that the NWay technology did not represent a meaningful advance. 
The only important function NWay provided was a unique signal that would 
serve to identify a device as supporting the new Fast Ethernet technology.  
There were several alternatives that the IEEE could have selected.60  The 
reason NWay was selected was likely because of the nominal fee National 
originally offered. If NWay was truly superior to the other alternatives, 
                                                                                                                            
84. 
55 FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 ¶ 21.  
56 FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 ¶ 23. Vertical Networks later 
assigned the patents to Negotiated Data Solutions. Like the FTC’s filings, this discussion 
refers to both entities together as Vertical Networks.  
57 Royall and Di Vincenzo, supra note 54 at 90. 
58 See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Negotiated Data 
Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094, at 4 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/05/0094/180122Analysis.pdf.  
59 See e.g. Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses How 
the Deal Is Done, Part 1, 3 Landslide 35 (2010). 
60 FTC Negotiated Data Complaint, supra note 51 at ¶ 11. 
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National could have charged far more than $1,000.61  
Despite covering little or no technical advance, this story shows the 
disproportionate value patent law bestowed on the NWay patents. The 
patents gave Vertical Networks the ability to demand enormous royalties.62 
That value was not based on any technical advance that the patents 
contributed to the standard. Rather, NWay patents were valuable because 
companies needed a license to them to make products that were IEEE 802.3 
compatible.63 In other words, the NWay patents possessed tremendous 
compatibility value. Without such a license to the NWay patents, companies 
risked being enjoined and shut out of the networking market.64 What’s 
more, they could be subject to outsized damage awards.65  
Compatibility value can be further broken down into ex post and ex ante 
compatibility values. Ex post compatibility value is the value a patent 
possesses because it allows patent holders to “holdup” a company that has 
already adopted the patented technology.66 Companies are particularly 
vulnerable to patent assertions after they have sunk large investments into 
designing, manufacturing and marketing a product.67  If such a company is 
found to infringe a patent, they will have large switching costs. 
Consequently, patent holders can negotiate outsized royalties that are 
primarily based on these switching costs, and not the value of any 
innovation the patent contributes.68 For the most part, the competitive harms 
of patent holdup are well known and both the courts and commenters have 
sought ways to curb the holdup problem.69   
                                                 
61 Some may quibble about whether NWay was better.   
62 Royall and Di Vincenzo, supra note 55 at 84. 
63 See e.g. Norman V. Siebrasse and Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for 
Determining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, __ Fla. L. Rev. __, 10-11(Dec 21, 
2015 SSRN Draft) (explaining why issuing injunctions for standards essential patents 
results in holdup). 
64 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006), the risk of such an injunction has been reduced but not disappeared. 
65 See infra Part IV discussing how patent remedies implicitly awards interface 
patentees compensation for benefits achieved from operating with a particular interface.  
66  See Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-
Setting Organizations, 77 ANTIRUST L.J. 855, 862 (2011); Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl 
Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTIRUST L.J. 
603, 607-610 (2007). 
67 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); See also, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (Mar. 
2011) available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-
marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307
patentreport.pdf.  
68 Id.  
69 See e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
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However, far less attention has been paid to the ex ante component of 
compatibility value. Ex ante compatibility value is the value a patent 
possesses because companies simply wish to enter a market that requires a 
license to a particular interface patent. In these cases, concerns about patent 
holdup are not present because new market entrants do not have any sunk 
costs. In other words, interface patents don’t possess ex post compatibility 
value in these contexts. Nonetheless, these patents still have ex ante value 
because market entrants still may desire to sell products like Gillette 
compatible replacement razors.70   
Now some commentators don’t object to patents possessing ex ante 
compatibility value.71 For example, Norman Siebrasse and Thomas Cotter 
say that reasonable royalties should take into account the fact that a “patent 
did wind up being included in the standard.”72 They arrive at this conclusion 
because they believe that “a patent incorporated into a standard is, all other 
things being equal, of greater social value than one that is not . . ..”73  But 
Siebrasse and Cotter are simply pointing out that patents have compatibility 
value.  Although such patents may have greater total value, I am only 
willing to reward them for improving on the prior art (i.e. innovation value). 
As the NWay example demonstrates, patents with little or no innovation 
value still can have both significant ex post and ex ante compatibility value. 
In other words, an NWay license was valuable because it helped companies 
avoid switching costs. Moreover, regardless of any sunk costs, having the 
right to sell products into the Ethernet market was still valuable for those 
companies that had yet to enter the market.  However, neither of these 
values make the standard any better. 
Of course these lessons apply to standards generally.74 Companies can 
                                                                                                                            
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (pointing out that injunctions against patent infringement “may 
not serve the public interest” in cases where “the patented invention is but a small 
component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”); See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to 
Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L.Rev. 149 (2007). 
70 See Jorge Contreras and Richard J. Gilbert, A United Framework for RAND and 
Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKLEY TECH L. J. 1451, 1468 (2015) (pointing out that 
patentees can exploit a company’s lack of alternatives after a standard has been adopted). 
71 Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 63 at 5 (arguing that patentees should be entitled to 
recover that “value that is conferred upon an individual SEP by virtue of its incorporation 
into the SSO’s chosen standard.”) 
72 Id. at 5-6. 
73 Id. at 6. 
74 Another good example of horizontal innovation in the standards context is the 
patented escape code sequence used in Hayes compatible modem the de facto standard. In 
re Hayes Microcomputer Prods, Inc., 982 F.2d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Trial 
testimony suggested that the particular characters chosen to represent the escape code were 
“arbitrary” and had no advantages. Id. at 1538-39. 
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develop arbitrarily different interfaces and patent them.  They can then use 
those patents to close access to those standards or obtain royalties. It is 
apparent that these remedies are undeserved when the patented interface is 
no better than existing ones. That is because the patent remedies implicitly 
allow interface patentees to recover for compatibility value (both ex ante 
and ex post).75 The result is that the public is issuing a valuable patent while 
receiving nothing in return.  Unfortunately, as the next example illustrates, 
the same kind of problem also exists with interface patents that cover real 
advances.  
 
C.  Apple’s Lightning Interface 
 
In this section, I describe an example of interface patents that cover a 
real, albeit, modest advance. Like the NWay patents, such patents are 
valuable because of the compatibility benefits they provide. But they are 
also valuable for a second distinct reason. They improve on prior interfaces. 
This is precisely the type of public benefit that the patent system desires. 
Unfortunately, these patents also can be used to control platforms and 
obtain rewards that have no connection to the size and nature of the advance 
the patent covers.  
Apple Computer has developed and patented just such an interface. It is 
the Lightning interface used in the latest generation of iPhones and iPads. 
Previous generations of the iPhone and iPad used 30 pin connector 
illustrated below to left below. Apple developed a smaller Lightning 
connector that it introduced with the iPhone 5 and iPad 3 (found in the 
center below). This connector is covered by U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,995 and 
8,461,465.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 In this example, compatibility value includes the switching costs that is often the 
focus of the holdup problem. See e.g. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 67 at 2008-10. But the 
Gillette example illustrate how compatibility value does not need to be associated with 
holdup. New entrants to the razor market do not have costs associated with switching 
designs. They are simply deciding whether to make Gillette compatible razors or not. 
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There was a general consensus that the old 30-pin connector used in the 
previous iPhone 4 was outdated. Many of its pins were no longer used and it 
made sense for Apple to move to a smaller more compact iPhone 5 
connector.76 However, Apple did not have to design a new connector itself. 
It could have used the open micro-USB standard (depicted to the right 
above). Indeed, the European Union was urging all smart phone 
manufacturers to adopt that standard.77 Even though the micro-USB 
connector was smaller and more compact, Apple chose to develop the 
Lightning connector and patent it.  One possibility is that the Lightning 
connector was no better than the micro-USB connector and Apple just 
wanted to exert control over the market for complementary market for 
iPhone 5 products. However, there is reason to believe that the Lightning 
connector was better suited for Apple’s needs than the micro-USB 
connector. The micro-USB connector could only carry 9 watts of power, but 
Lightning connector could carry 10 watts. Nine watts was sufficient for 
smart phones like the iPhone 5, but Apple was also using the same 
connector for its new generation of iPads.78 Using the Lightning connector 
allowed iPads to recharge at substantially faster speeds. Thus, the Lightning 
was apparently better than the prior art in at least one respect.  
Because these patents cover an advance, they don’t offend patent law in 
the way patents on horizontal innovation do. Nonetheless, current law gives 
the owner of these patents disproportionate power. By patenting the 
Lightning interface, Apple could demand a royalty for the right to make 
products that are compatible with iPhones and iPads.79 Thus, companies 
that wish to make compatible speakers, credit card swipers or other 
accessories need a license from Apple.80 This is true even if Apple own no 
applicable intellectual property in the way the accessory otherwise operates. 
For example, Bose, a noted speaker company, may have developed 
                                                 
76 Anand Lal Shimpi, Brian Klug & Vivek, Gowri, Lighting 9-pin:Replacing the 30-
pin Dock Connector (Oct. 16, 2012)(discussing why the 30-pin dock connector was 
destined for a more modern, compact replacement . . ..”) available at 
http://www.anandtech.com/show/6330/the-iphone-5-review/14 
77 Bryan Chaffin, EU Approves Universal Smartphone Charger Standard, the Mac 
Observer, (Dec. 30, 2010) available at 
http://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/eu_approves_universal_smartphone_charger_sta
ndard.  
78 Steve Wildstrom, Why Apple Couldn’t Go to Micro USB Charging, Mashable,  
(Sept. 6 2012) available at http://mashable.com/2012/10/29/apple-lightning-micro-usb/. 
79 This is purely from a physical perspective. Other intellectual property undoubtedly 
helps Apple control what software may run on the iOS operating system. 
80 More and more physical connections are becoming obsolete and are being replaced 
by wireless ones. The same analysis could easily be done for wireless standards, but their 
technical details are unduly complex. 
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significant innovations for its sound system, but still have to pay Apple for 
the privilege of making a speaker system that docks with the iPhone 5.  
Importantly, these companies probably do not care about how fast the 
Lightning interface allows iPhones and iPads to charge. These companies 
simply want to be able to sell their products to the millions of Apple 
customers. In other words, even though the Lightning patents possess both 
compatibility value and technical value, it's the compatibility value that 
dominates.  
Now lets’ take a step back. Relying on the NWay story, I explained why 
interface patents on horizontal technology should not give their owners the 
right to control access to products that use the patented interface. But 
patents like the Lightning patents are different because that cover some 
meaningful advance. These inventors should be rewarded because the 
patents have made a meaningful contribution to the public. The key is to 
disentangle innovation value from compatibility value and only allow the 
patentee to only recover for the former category.  
 
III. PRIOR THINKING 
 
Part III addresses two lines of relevant thinking. In Section A, I discuss 
proposals concerned specifically with interface patents and standards. To a 
large extent, these commentators focus on “competition values”, the role 
that interface patents play in promoting (or stunting) technical standards. 
But for the most part, such works treat patents monolithically. They assume 
each patent contributes the same fixed, but immeasurable sized innovation. 
My proposal seeks to inject another dimension into these standards focused 
discussions so that they think about patents in a more nuanced fashion. 
In Section B, I discuss a different line of thinking that seeks to change 
patent law to align it more closely with its underlying innovation advancing 
goals. This line of thinking focuses on “patent values”, as distinguished 
from the “competition values” discussed in Section A.  Commentators that 
think about patent values often propose reforms that depend on the 
particular contribution a patent makes. This article follows in this patent 
centric tradition, but it extends on that thinking and applies it to issues that 
appear to be unique to the interface and standards world. 
 
A.  Interface Theory 
 
Many commentators have debated whether interfaces should be 
patented, and if so to what extent. In 2008, Pam Samuelson discussed more 
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than twenty five different suggestions for regulating interface patents.81 The 
various proposals Samuelson reviewed sought to achieve more 
compatibility among information and communications technologies.82  
For the most part, these commentators focused on how patents are used. 
Others suggest that recommendations need to turn patents competitive 
environments.  All these characteristics certainly help us understand the role 
patents play in competition. But the qualities are all extrinsic characteristics 
that have no connection to what the patent contributes. Often the resulting 
policy recommendation does not care whether the patent covers an 
important new advance or an invention that is no better than existing 
technology (i.e the patent’s intrinsic value). But from patent perspective, it 
makes little sense to discuss interface patents without thinking about the 
most important patent values, the nature and degree of innovation the patent 
contributes. The main thrust of this article is to suggest that good patent 
policy (including any policy addressing interface patents) needs to 
incorporate that dimension into its decision making.  
Several commentators have suggested banning patents on interfaces or 
immunizing their use.83 For example, some have argued that under 
European law, software patents cannot cover interfaces because they are 
simply unpatentable “ideas and principles.”84 Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court may have already implicitly adopted this proposal in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank, a broad sweeping decision that has invalidated many 
different categories of software patents.85 On a similar vein, the European 
Parliament considered, but ultimately rejected, a proposal that would have 
declared the use of software interface patents as non-infringing.86 Julie 
Cohen has also suggested effectively doing away with interface patents that 
lockout competition by relying on the patent misuse doctrine.87 Finally, Phil 
Weiser has also relied on patent misuse to limit interface patents, but his 
“Competitive Platforms Model” focuses on market factors as opposed to 
                                                 
81 See Samuelson supra note 34 at 2004. 
82 Id.  
83See Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1970-1979 (providing a survey of these different 
proposals).  
84 W.R. Cornish, Inter-operable Systems and Copyright, 11 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 391 
(1989); Council Directive 91/250, On the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 
O.J. (L 122) 42, 43 (EC). 
85 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l et al., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014); see also, Digitech 
Image v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(finding that a patent that 
described the format for tagging digital images was invalid in view of Alice).  
86 Samuelson, supra note 34 at 1978. 
87 Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: 
Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 
1181 (1995) (Cohen calls this a paradox because enforcing one’s right leads to losing that 
very right).  
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any patent specific factors.88   
Notably, none of these proposals isolate the issue of horizontal 
innovation. Rather, they focus on the harms of patenting interfaces 
regardless of the significance of the advance covered by the patent. To 
illustrate this distinction, we can delve into Cohen’s misuse proposal. It is 
fairly representative of those proposals that would effectively eliminate or 
render ineffective interface patents. Cohen used the facts from Nintendo’s 
dispute with Atari to justify the application of misuse.  
In that case, Nintendo had developed a security system for its game 
console, the Nintendo Entertainment System (“NES”), to prevent 
unauthorized games from running on the console.89 The security system was 
covered by a patent and the underlying software by copyright law.90 
Through a combination of reverse engineering and subterfuge, Atari 
developed its “Rabbit” program to unlock the NES so that it could freely 
develop games and sell them to customers that owned Nintendo’s systems.91 
Nintendo sued for both patent and copyright infringement. Nintendo lost on 
its copyright claims but the court found that Atari infringed Nintendo’s 
patent.92 Although Atari had raised patent misuse as a defense, the parties 
settled before the court reached that issue.93   
Cohen has characterized Nintendo’s patent assertion as a 
“straightforward” case of patent misuse. She explains: 
 
Nintendo's patent monopoly extended only to the lock-out 
programs embedded in its console and cartridges, not to the 
console itself, nor to the console operating system . . . . Nintendo's 
subsequent use of the lock-out patent to ensure that only its 
licensees could gain access to the console was an unlawful 
extension of the patent grant. 94  
 
Cohen’s analysis oversimplifies the patent analysis in the Nintendo case 
by distinguishing the lock-out program from the console itself. However, 
                                                 
88 Phil Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 534 (2003).  
89 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 835-37 
(Fed.Cir.1992). 
90 Nintendo’s patent was U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 entitled “System for Determining 
Authenticity of an External Memory used in an Information Processing Apparatus”. 
91 Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 837. Atari had applied to the Copyright Office for a 
reproduction of the 10NES program falsely saying that it was a defendant in an 
infringement action and needed a copy of the program for that litigation.  
92 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 
1993). 
93 Cohen, supra, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1104. 
94 Id. (emphasis added).   
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the lock-out program did not exist apart from the physical components that 
resided on both the console and the cartridge. Moreover, even if we could 
somehow separately identify some “ethereal” interface that existed in 
between the components it connected, Cohen’s distinction does not 
accurately reflect what Nintendo’s patent covered. For example, claim 1 
from that patent contains limitations that correspond to the console’s data 
processor, an authenticating processor that resides on the console (the 2nd 
recited authenticating processor) and a “control means” for resetting the 
system.95 Thus, Cohen is not being totally forthright when she says that 
Nintendo’s patent does not extend to the console.  It did. And interface 
patents almost always claim parts of the devices that connect to the 
interface.96 
Cohen’s characterization is really a conceptual one and it makes 
imminent sense from an innovation perspective. The technology claimed in 
Nintendo’s patent did not allow either the console or the cartridge to operate 
better.  The games did not play any faster or use less storage. Nor were the 
graphics any more precise. Nevertheless, Nintendo sought to use the 
interface security patent in a manner that went beyond the security system 
itself.  It was seeking to control consoles and cartridges too. That certainly 
sounds like the “straightforward” case of patent misuse that Cohen 
identified. 
But the problem with Cohen’s proposal and others like it is that they 
don’t consider the varying levels of innovation the patents may cover. 
Cohen does not discuss whether Nintendo’s patent represents an advance 
over the prior art.  For example, a new interface could allow products to 
                                                 
95 Claim 1 recites:  
 A system for determining whether a videographics software program is authorized for 
use in an information processing apparatus, comprising: 
a main data processor unit for executing a videographics software program; 
an external memory for storing the videographics software program and for removable 
connection to said main processor unit, said external memory and main processor unit 
together constituting the information processing apparatus for executing the videographics 
software program; 
a first authenticating processor device associated with said external memory for 
executing a first predetermined authenticating program to determine the authenticity of said 
external memory; 
a second authenticating processor device which is installed in said main data processor 
unit for executing a second predetermined authenticating program to determine the 
authenticity of said external memory; and 
control means for resetting said main data processor unit unless the execution of said 
first authenticating program by said first processor device exhibits a predetermined 
relationship to the execution of said second authenticating program by said second 
processor device. 
96 For example, both Gillette’s interface patent and the Apple Lightning patent include 
physical element from the component that use their respective interfaces. 
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communicate faster or include additional information.97  Now that does not 
appear to be the case with Nintendo’s patent which merely provided a 
method for authenticating cartridges. When that kind of patent is being used 
to foreclose competition for devices that connect to it, the patent is not 
serving any patent purpose. In other words, because there is no innovation, 
the patent system does not need to reward its inventor. It may make sense to 
declare these kinds of patents unenforceable.  But the harder case occurs 
when an interface patent covers a real innovation. There are patent reasons 
(i.e. incentivizing innovation) for issuing and enforcing such patents.  
Cohen’s proposal does not recognize this distinction. Taken at face value, it 
appears that Cohen would declare that all interface patents -- even if 
significantly innovative -- unenforceable because of misuse. The approach 
described in this paper differs from Cohen’s proposal by only nullifying 
those patents that did not represent an advance over the prior art. 
Phil Weiser also suggests using patent misuse to limit interface patents, 
but he focuses on a different factors – specifically, the competitive market 
where the patented interface resides.98 Relying on what he calls the 
“Competitive Platforms Model”, Weiser would allow companies to use 
intellectual property to close their standards so long as there was 
competition between rivals.99 For example, because videogame 
manufacturers, like Sony, Nintendo and Microsoft compete vigorously, 
under Weiser’s theory, these companies should be allowed to use their 
intellectual property to close their respective platforms. However, when a 
single platform wins out and becomes dominant (e.g. Microsoft Windows), 
the standard should become open.100 Doctrines of fair use and patent misuse 
would come into play to prevent enforcement of copyright rights and 
patents respectively.101  Weiser’s proposal is intended to place incentives at 
a time when they are needed the most, before market dominance is 
achieved.102  
While the competitive platforms model certainly advances our thinking 
about optimizing competition, it also does not consider the innovation 
                                                 
97 For example, around 2001, Intel developed and patented a quad pumped front side 
bus to allow its processors to communicate faster with chipsets. See e.g. U.S. Patent No. 
US 6,807,592 entitled “Quad pumped bus architecture and protocol.”  
98 Weiser, supra note 88 at 556.  
99 Id. at 536 (“This model embraces proprietary development where there is 
competition between rival platform standards, but calls for open standards where a single 
platform standard wins out . . .”) 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 556. 
102 Id. at 583 (“the competitive platforms model . . . reconciles the need to confer the 
investment incentives necessary to spur innovation with the risk of protecting proprietary 
dominance.”) 
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dimension. Put more concretely, taking Weiser at face value, he would 
permit enforcement of an interface patent that reflected no technical 
advance (i.e. horizontal innovation) so long as the underlying platform had 
significant competition. At the other end of the spectrum, Weiser’s model 
suggests that the law should not enforce an interface patent covering a 
significant advance if the patentee already had a dominant position in the 
underlying platform. Both these scenarios are problematic. Patents that 
don’t cover a technical advance should not give their owner any rights. 
Since Weiser only examines a patent’s context and not the quality of the 
patent itself, his model is really not considering patent values (i.e. 
rewarding inventors for innovations that benefit the public). While the law 
might wish to temper that reward when the patent covers an interface, 
eliminating interface patents in some market contexts is a drastic step that is 
at odds with core patent law principles. To be fair, Weiser admits that his 
model “is only one component of a more comprehensive vision for 
regulation . . ..”103 The current proposal takes a different tact then Weiser.  
It would open every standard, but allow the interface patent owner to extract 
rents based on the level of innovation the patent contributed.  
In sum, recent thinking on interface patents often focuses on 
competition values and treats interface patents monolithically. But patents 
do not just come in one flavor. They can cover horizontal innovation, 
modest advances, pioneering inventions or anything in between. My 
proposal seeks to distinguish between all these patents and adjust the 
remedy accordingly. 
 
B.  Patent Injury 
 
Others have previously complained that intellectual property laws often 
give their owner strong rights that are incompatible with the underlying 
goals of those laws.104 In particular, Christina Bohannan and Herbert 
Hovenkamp argue that IP law should only recognize harm “that is tied to 
the purpose for which the IP laws were passed in the first place.”105 
Bohannan and Hovenkamp label such harm as an “IP Injury.”106  For patent 
law, claims of infringement that have “no impact on the incentive to 
innovate” are not IP Injuries.107 Thus, Bohannan and Hovenkamp would 
limit the ability to assert patents against infringements that could not be 
                                                 
103 Id. at 540. 
104 Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint, 33, 39 
(2012).   
105 Id at 51. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 53. 
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foreseen at the time of the invention.108 More concretely, they suggest 
prohibiting inventors from amending their claims to capture after arising 
technology.109  
But Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s focus is on whether a particular 
policy encourages innovation at all. They do not examine the nature of the 
innovation itself. A natural extension of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s 
proposal is to question incentives to innovate that do not improve on current 
technology. Because these innovations do not promote progress, this article 
argues that patent law should not encourage these horizontal innovations. 
To borrow Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s terminology, infringement of 
patents that merely cover horizontal innovation should not count as a 
“compensable IP injury.” 
That is not to say that commentators have not thought about working 
on different patent law levers to account for size of the contribution the 
patent makes over the prior art. They have. For example, Dan Burk and 
Mark Lemley have argued that patent law should give greater claim scope 
to so called “pioneering inventions.”110 Similarly, many other have argued 
that damages should be apportioned based on the incremental value the 
patented invention adds to the prior art.111 However, those commentators 
have not studied the far end of the innovation spectrum, where patents cover 
arbitrarily intricate inventions that are no better than what society already 
has. Indeed, there appears to be an assumption underlying all these 
proposals that a patented invention must be at least a little better than the 
prior art.112 But in the context of interface/standards, patents on horizontal 
innovation are still valuable. This article exposes the competitive harm 
these patents inflict and offers a remedies based proposal to address it.   
 
IV. A REMEDIES SOLUTION 
 
                                                 
108 Id. at 57-58 (explaining that unforeseen or “speculative” infringements would not 
affect an innovator’s decision to create a work). 
109 Id. at 70. 
110 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1796-97 (2009); but see, Brian J. Love, 
Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 379 (2012)(criticizing the 
pioneer invention doctrine and arguing that other doctrines give pioneer inventors generous 
rights.) 
111 See infra notes 133 to 136 to and accompanying text.  
112 The pioneering invention doctrine that Burk and Lemley mention gives such 
inventions more expansive scope under the doctrine of equivalents.  But no one has 
suggested constraining that scope for patents that cover only minor advances.  Similarly, 
Amy Landers discusses how to apportion damages based on the patent’s contribution over 
the prior art, but she never suggests awarding no damages when that contribution is 
valueless. Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential 
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2012). 
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In the past, I have suggested that refining remedies offers the best way 
to calibrate patent law to handle varying degrees of infringement.113 I 
believe that a similar solution also makes sense for the problem of 
horizontal innovation. After all, measuring infringement and measuring 
innovation are very similar endeavors. The former determines the gap 
between the accused device and the patent; while the latter assesses the gap 
between the patent and the prior art.  Both these kinds of differences can be 
thought to reside on a continuum.  Because money damages also resides on 
a spectrum, it can be used to calibrate incentives to correspond to value the 
patented invention. 
But for the most part, that does not happen in today’s regime. One 
problem with the way patent remedies has historically operated is that it 
allowed patent holders to obtain injunctions and receive large damages 
awards even when the patent covered technology that is no better than the 
prior art.  That allowed the patentee to capture value that stems from access 
to products that use the interface (“compatibility value”) as opposed to 
value that stems from the patented improvement (“innovation value”).  
To illustrate this problem, we can consider the patented Apple Lightning 
interface.114  The interface is apparently better than the prior art because it 
allows iPads and iPhones to charge more quickly.  The patents also allow 
Apple to control who sells products on those platforms. Both characteristics 
are valuable, but only one is related to the patented technical advance. My 
proposal would limit Apple to recovering reasonable royalties for the value 
of charging devices more quickly, not for the value of being able to sell 
Apple compatible products.  
In practice, that means changing the way patent law awards damages 
and issues permanent injunctions. Patent law should only award a remedy if 
the underlying technology is better than the prior art. To achieve this goal 
patent law will have to stop awarding lost profits and issuing injunctions for 
all necessary interface patents because innovation and compatibility values 
are inextricably bound together in those remedies.  Moreover, reasonable 
royalty damages will have to be limited to the value of the technical 
advance and no value should be attributed simply because the interface 
helps a product achieve compatibility.  The Federal Circuit has already 
taken a step in this direction when calculating reasonable royalties for 
standards essential patents.115 But the court needs to extend this concept to 
                                                 
113 Chao, The Infringement Continuum, supra note 24 at 1404-12.  
114 I use the Apple example to illustrate the power an interface patent has, but Apple 
has not used its Lightning patents to prevent companies from making Lightning to USB 
cords that essentially open up the iPad and iPhone platform from a physical connection.  In 
short, Apple is NOT enforcing its Lightning patents in the way I hypothesize here.  
115 See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text. 
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encompass all necessary interface patents.  
To illustrate the different aspects of this proposal, this section proceeds 
in two parts. First, section A explains why injunctions will no longer be 
available for any necessary interface patents Second, section B describes 
how patent’s law damages framework needs to change to encourage the 
innovation values that lie at the heart of the current proposal. 
  
A.  Injunctions 
 
Denying a reward to those that have developed technology that is not 
better than the prior art should be fairly uncontroversial. Those inventors 
have not contributed anything meaningful to the public. Therefore, they 
deserve nothing. This rather basic insight has practical significance. At a 
minimum, it means that owners of patents that cover purely horizontal 
technology should not be entitled to injunctive relief. That proposition begs 
another harder question. Should injunctive relief be available to interface 
patents that cover real advances?  Surprisingly, the answer is again no. 
Injunctions should not be awarded for any necessary interface patent. 
To understand why the prohibition against injunctions should also 
apply to better interfaces, it important to keep in mind that the basic goal of 
my proposal is to isolate innovation value and provide a share of that value 
(and only that value) to the patentee. Interface patents have a unique 
characteristic. The reason why companies want to use a particular interface 
often stems from the popularity of the platform, and not the technical 
benefits of the particular interface. For example, the reason why a company 
wants to make credit card swipers that work with iPhones and iPads has 
nothing to do with the fast charging Lightning interface and everything to 
do with those products’ commercial success. In other words, companies 
would seek to use the Lightning interface even it were not better than other 
interfaces. They just want the opportunity to sell their products to the 
millions of customers that use Apple’s products.116 In short, those 
companies value Apple’s Lightning interface patents because of the 
considerable compatibility value they possess, and not because of the 
patents’ innovation value.117 
Unfortunately, when permanent injunctions are issued, the patentee 
inevitably recovers for the value of gaining access to any complementary 
products. The compatibility value manifests itself in two ways.  The 
patentee can foreclose competition in complementary markets (i.e. enforce 
                                                 
116 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(noting that when a technology is incorporated into a standard, . . . that technology is not 
always used because it is the best or the only option; it is used because its use is necessary 
to comply with the standard.”) 
117 Id. (noting that “widespread adoption of standard essential technology is not 
entirely indicative of the added usefulness of an innovation over the prior art.”) 
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the injunction) or extracts rents from those markets (i.e. requires infringer to 
pay money to lift the injunction).118 That’s why Gillette can prevent others 
from making razors that work with Gillette’s handles. 
The issue becomes more complicated when patents actually cover 
better technology. In these situations, the patentees undoubtedly are entitled 
to some remedy when others use their invention. But that recovery should 
be based on benefits that stem from the advance the invention contributes 
(i.e. how much better the patented interface is than the prior art). 
Unfortunately, injunctions on interface patents allow their owners to do 
much more.  Again, consider Apple’s patented Lightning interface. The fact 
that the interface allows devices to charge more quickly certainly has some 
value. But it should not give Apple the ability to determine who can and 
cannot make devices that operate with its iPads and iPhones. That would 
vastly overcompensate Apple for figuring out how to increase charging 
speeds. Put more generally, patent law should give inventors incentives to 
innovate. But those incentives should not be so large that it allows inventors 
to capture benefits associated with complementary goods, as distinguished 
from the advance in the interface itself.  
The first step in changing this result is to eliminate the availability of 
injunctions for all necessary interface patents. I use the term “necessary” to 
describe interface patents that other companies need to infringe in order to 
make products that operate with some complementary products. This 
definition includes any standard essential patent but it goes further and 
includes interfaces that are not part of any formal standard, like the way 
Gillette’s handles connect with its razors.  
This proposal would be a fundamental shift from the current law. For 
many years, courts had automatically awarded prevailing patentees a 
permanent injunction against further infringement.119 However, in eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that courts should apply 
the traditional four-factor test they use in other areas of the law.120 Those 
factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the 
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance 
of hardships on the respective parties; and (4) whether granting an 
injunction would disservice the public interest.121   
In practice, that has meant that when an infringer competes with the 
patentee, the patentee can typically obtain a permanent injunction. That is 
because courts generally view money damages as adequate for non-
practicing entities.122 Such entities are simply seeking to obtain the highest 
                                                 
118 Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse As Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 503, 505 
(2011)(discussing the problems of using intellectual property to foreclose) 
119 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay II), 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d+ 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
120 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
121 Id. at 390–91. 
122 See e.g. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 
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royalty they can. In contrast, when the patentee is competing with the 
infringer, money damages are often inadequate because the parties are 
fighting over future market share.123  Since eBay was decided, patent 
holders who compete with an infringer have been granted permanent 
injunctions in 84% of the cases while patentees who did not compete only 
receive injunctions 21% of the time.124 Returning to our examples, under 
current law, Apple and Gillette are likely to obtain permanent injunctions 
against companies that infringe their patented interfaces because they would 
compete with any infringer. In contrast, a Vertical Networks (a non-
practicing entity) would not be able to obtain an injunction against future 
infringement of the NWay patents.  
The proposal would change how courts apply the eBay factors, in a 
manner that is fully consistent with eBay’s general framework. The basic 
premise is that inventors are only entitled to capture a share of the benefits 
the patented invention contributes, but no more. Under this view, a properly 
sized royalty should be considered adequate compensation. Importantly, the 
owner of interface patent would not be entitled to control the market for 
complementary products. Thus, the first two eBay factors are satisfied.125  
Denying injunctive relief for necessary interface patents is also 
consistent with the third eBay factor, which requires examining the balance 
of hardship. Again, if we accept the basic premise -- that interface inventors 
should receive a royalty, but not obtain value for helping achieve 
compatibility - the balance of hardship clearly weighs against issuing an 
injunction.  Although the infringer must pay some royalty for the benefit it 
receives from the patented advance, the infringer would suffer from serious 
hardship if it could not compete in a market at all.  In contrast, so long as 
                                                                                                                            
1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying injunctive relief after finding money damages were 
adequate in view of patentee’s extensive licensing efforts, and no direct competition).  
123 Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, U. PA. L. REV. 
Online, 61, 63 (2016); See e.g. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 
1152-53 (Fed. Cir. 2011)(patentee demonstrated that it would sustain irreparable harm 
from competitor's infringement of patents given undisputed evidence of direct 
competition).  
124 See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: 
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. at *36 (July 18, 2015 draft on file with author) 
(counting district court decisions through the end of 2013); see also Colleen V. Chien & 
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
10 tbl.1 (2012) (finding that district courts granted NPEs injunctions in 26% of total 
requests and only 7% when the injunction was opposed by the infringer from May 2006 
through August 2011); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts 
Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 71 (2009) (because such entities are seeking money, courts 
generally find no irreparable and that money damages are adequate).  
125 The first and second eBay factors are often considered to be corollaries. If one is 
true, the second follows. See, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note at 111 (noting 
that courts often analyze the first two factors together). 
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the patentee receives the appropriate royalty, it has not suffered a 
recognizable hardship. 
The fourth public interest factor also weighs against issuing injunctions 
in these types of cases. eBay signified a shift in focus from one based purely 
on the property rights of patentees to a more public-minded analysis.126 The 
current proposal follows a similar vein. Given that the purpose of patent law 
is to incentivize inventors to make disclose meaningful advances, it only 
makes sense to compensate patentees for “innovation value” not 
“compatibility value.” 
Now the courts have recently taken a small step in a similar direction.  
In Apple v. Samsung (Apple I), the Federal Circuit placed a significant 
limitation on the ability of a patentee to obtain a permanent injunction.127 It 
is not sufficient to show that the infringer’s sales are causing irreparable 
harm to the patentee, there must also be a “causal nexus” between the 
infringing feature and the harm.128 A literal application of this requirement 
would probably eliminate injunctions for most minor features. As the court 
said “sales lost to an infringing product cannot irreparably harm a 
patentee if consumers buy that product for reasons other than the 
patented feature.”129 Thus, the Federal Circuit is now assessing whether to 
issue a permanent injunction based on how much the patented feature 
contributes to the infringing product.  
However, the causal nexus requirement does not solve the basic 
problem with interface patents. It limits the availability of injunctions to 
those patents that contribute features that are sufficiently significant that 
they drive consumer demand. These are patents that possess significant 
innovation value.130 Unfortunately, this solution masks the underlying 
problem by burying the importance of compatibility value. Because these 
patents contribute significant advances, it is easy to assume that they should 
be entitled to an injunction.131  But that is not the case. Awarding injunctive 
                                                 
126 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (suggesting that the courts can use their “equitable 
discretion over injunctions” to “adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in 
the patent system.”). 
127 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The 
Federal Circuit initially discussed the “causal nexus” requirement in the context of the 
standard for determining preliminary injunctions. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co, 
678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (2012)(“Apple I”); But see, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (Apple 
IV), No. 2014-1802, 2015 WL 9014387, *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2015), modifying and 
superseding 801 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (weakening the causal nexus standard 
established in Apple I); See Chao, Causation and Harm, supra note 123 (criticizing Apple 
IV). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. quoting Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1324.   
130 As a practical matter, this may be a very small a subset of interface patents. 
131 In fact, Contreras and Gilbert argue that there does not need to be any “special 
analysis” in determining whether to grant an injunction for a standard essential patent 
subject to commitment to license it under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 
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relief inevitably gives patentees undeserved compatibility value. To the 
extent that interface patents cover significant advances, damages recoveries 
should increase and that should suffice.  
Importantly, the idea of eliminating injunctions for necessary interface 
patents is only part of the larger proposal.132  Inventors of innovative patents 
still need to be fairly compensated. But because injunctions give their 
owners value unrelated to the contribution the interface patents make, 
injunctions should not be issued in these cases. Instead, it makes far more 
sense to provide money damages for those patents that cover real advances. 
That discussion follows in the next section.  
 
B.  Damages 
 
Identifying horizontal innovation is not easy. Sophisticated companies 
will undoubtedly be able to disguise their interface patents on horizontal 
innovation and argue that they cover some meaningful advance over the 
prior art. The current proposal takes this possibility into account and offers 
a solution that can adjust to the varying levels of innovation that exist in the 
real world. Because money damages are easily adjusted and fall on 
spectrum, my proposal relies on awarding reasonable royalties that 
correspond to the size of the patented advance. I am not the first to offer this 
kind of proposal. At different times, Congress considered adopting 
legislation that would explicitly require apportionment.133 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has discussed the need to apportion damages as far back as 
Garretson v. Clark.134 However, the concept has been obscured by the 
fifteen factor Georgia-Pacific test that is currently used to calculate 
                                                                                                                            
Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 70 at 1457. 
132 This conclusion adds to growing chorus of scholars that advocate for the 
elimination/reduction of injunctions in similar contexts, albeit for many different reasons. 
Samuelson, supra note 34 at 2009 (suggesting that injunction should not be issued for 
necessary interface patents so long as damages can cover R&D costs); Peter Lee, The 
Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH L. REV. 39, 44-45 (2008) (arguing that 
courts should use injunctions less when considering infringement of patents that cover 
infrastructure); O’Rourke, supra note 35 at 123-34 (arguing that infringers of application 
programming interface patents should be able to continue to infringe under the doctrine of 
fair use, but pay compensation at “less than fair market value”); but see Contreras & 
Gilbert, supra note 70 at 1462 (arguing against a rule denying injunctive relief for SEP 
saying that “an injunction may be necessary . . . to bring the [infringer] to the bargaining 
table.”)  
133 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2008, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). 
134  Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in every case 
give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's 
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features.”) 
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reasonable royalties.135 Several commentators have urged the courts restore 
the doctrine to prominence by insisting that they identify a patent’s 
inventive contribution before assessing damages.136 
I will not repeat the many worthy arguments in favor apportionment, but 
I have two points to add in the context of necessary interface patents. First, 
lost profits don’t make sense for interface patents. As is the case for 
injunctions, lost profits allows the patentee to capture value associated with 
the infringer achieving compatibility with other products that use the 
interface.  Therefore, lost profits should be discarded and all damages 
should be awarded using a reasonably royalty calculation. Second, the 
existing “hypothetical negotiation” framework for calculating reasonable 
royalties also does not work for interface patents. The law must explicitly 
exclude compatibility value from the hypothetical negotiation. Otherwise, 
reasonable royalty calculations will suffer from the same problems inherent 
in injunctions and lost profits. Thankfully, the Federal Circuit has already 
begun to adopt the second recommendation for standard essential patents.137 
 
1. Lost Profits 
 
Under the statute governing patent damages, a prevailing patentee can 
receive lost profits.138 But if the patentee does not have any lost profits or is 
unable to prove them, a reasonable royalty is always available.139 The 
problem with lost profits theory is that it tries to return the patentee to the 
place she would have occupied had there been no infringement.140 
                                                 
135 See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). A number of commentators have 
complained about the difficulty of applying this test consistently. See Landers, supra note 
112 at 491; Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627, 628 (2010). 
136 See e.g. Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 70 at *36; David O. Taylor, Using 
Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 144 (2014) 
(suggesting that the Georgia Pacific test should “focus” the analysis on “the value of 
patented technology”); Landers, supra note 112 at 473; Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. 
White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia- Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (for arguments in favor of apportionment). 
137 See infra notes 153 to 162 and accompanying text. 
138 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award 
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less 
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with 
interest and costs as fixed by the court.”). 
139 Id. 
140 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) 
(“[The] question (is) primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-
Licensee have made?” (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 
(5th Cir. 1958))); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886) (stating that a 
3-Feb-16] Horizontal Innovation 35 
Unfortunately, in the case of interface patents, that recovery inherently 
includes value unrelated to the contribution the patent makes. A lost profits 
theory allows the patentee to implicitly recover compatibility value.  
Consider Gillette’s March 3 and Fusion shaving systems again. To gain 
access to the millions of Gillette customers, a competing razor manufacturer 
would need to include Gillette’s patented interface in its razors and thereby 
commit patent infringement. Under current law, Gillette would clearly be 
able recover lost profits associated with any sales that the competitor took 
from Gillette.141 In this case, all the lost profits are really attributable to 
compatibility values. The only reason for a competitor to infringe would be 
to gain access to customer’s that previously purchased Gillette’s handles. 
The lost profits have nothing to do with any technical contributions made 
by the patents because there was none.  
The lost profits problem extends to interface patents that cover real 
advances too. To illustrate this point, I make a slight variation to the 
Lightning example. Assume that besides charging devices more quickly, the 
Lighting interface made products that used the interface less expensive to 
manufacture.142Additionally, assume that Apple is competing with 
EasySwipe, a company that makes infringing credit card swipers that 
connect to iPads and iPhones. Again, under current law, Apple will be able 
recover lost profits for all the sales that Apple lost to EasySwipe.  However, 
in this case we might be able to say that some lost sales were due to the 
lower price EasySwipe was able to charge for using the patented interface.  
Of course none of EasySwipes sales could have been made if its products 
were not compatible with iPads and iPhones But that is not value 
attributable to the patent and the law should not compensate for that loss.143   
These two examples illustrate the problem with awarding lost profits in 
the contexts. It is simply impossible to distinguish between value stemming 
from the technical contribution the patent makes and value from helping a 
produce achieve compatibility.  That is why the sole remedy that the law 
should award to necessary interface patents is a modified reasonable 
royalty. The next section explains how that royalty should be calculated. 
                                                                                                                            
patentee’s damages are “the difference between his pecuniary condition after the 
infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not 
occurred”). 
141 To obtain lost profits a patentee must show: “(1) demand for the patented product, 
(2) [the] absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) [her] manufacturing and 
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit [s]he would have 
made.”  Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
142 I suggest a different beneficial feature because charging iPads and iPhones quickly 
does not appear to benefit the card swiper. 
143  Bohannan and Hovenkamp apply this kind of argument to the sale of related 
products (e.g. Apple’s lost swiper sales might also caused it to lose software sales). They 
say the loss of such sales should not be considered a compensable IP Injury. Bohannan & 
Hovenkamp supra note 104 at _.  
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2. Reasonable Royalties 
 
The preceding section rejected lost profits theory in favor of 
calculating damages based on the value the patentee contributed to the 
infringing product. That is essentially a royalty calculation, albeit not the 
one the courts now use.  In its current form, a “reasonable royalty” is 
calculated using the Georgia-Pacific test.144 Jurors are instructed to 
ascertain the royalty that the parties would have agreed upon had they 
successfully negotiated a license just before infringement began. The 
hypothetical negotiation assumes that the patent at issue is valid and 
infringed. There are a mind-boggling fifteen factors that are used to 
calculate the royalty under this analysis.145 The ninth factor is the factor that 
                                                 
144 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). Reasonable royalty awards can 
also be calculated using “the so-called ‘analytical approach.’” See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura 
Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986); accord JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT 
DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3:8 (2013). But this test is almost never used. Therefore, I 
will not address it. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific 
Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1673 
(“Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are based on the fifteen-factor [Georgia-
Pacific] test . . . .”).  
145 See Ga.-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The factors are:  
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, 
proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold. 
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent 
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses 
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, 
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or 
whether they are inventor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products 
of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of 
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed 
sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, 
if any, that had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial 
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those 
who have used the invention. 
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accounts for the contribution the patent makes over the prior art.  
Apportionment would bring this factor to the forefront by asking the court 
to: 1) isolate the particular patented advance, 2) distinguish it from the prior 
art, and 3) and ask the fact finder to assess on royalty on that invention.146 
Until just recently, reasonable royalty awards implicitly included 
compatibility value.147 For example, factor four is “[t]he licensor's 
established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly 
by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under 
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.”148 This factor 
assumes that a patentee can use necessary interface patents to foreclose 
competition in products that use the interface.149 Royalty awards are 
increased royalty if it has such policy.  In other words, if Gillette has a 
policy of forbidding others from making compatible razors, an infringer 
would have to pay higher damages for infringing an interface patent than it 
otherwise would even if the patent did not cover any real advance.  
Factor eight considers the commercial success and popularity of 
products made under the patent.150 Returning to the Lightning interface 
example, Apple could rely on this to discuss the value of connecting to 
Apple products. At the time of first infringement (i.e. when the swiper 
enters the market), the parties will have already understood that a license to 
the Lightning interface will allow EasySwipe to sell its product to the Apple 
community. For many products, iPhone and iPad compatibility can be the 
                                                                                                                            
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the 
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the 
invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as 
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business 
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the 
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been 
reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a 
prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to 
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—would have 
been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which 
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a 
license. 
146 Landers, supra note 112 at 473-74.  
147 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229-31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(explaining how various Georgia-Pacific factors were inconsistent how parties approach 
standards essential patents). 
148 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
149 See supra notes 122 to 124 and accompanying text explaining that permanent 
injunctions are typically issued in the present of direct competition.  
150 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
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difference between success and failure.151  Because Apple has the leverage, 
we would expect Apple to negotiate for a large portion of the swiper’s 
expected profits.   
Of course this argument has no relationship to the size of any 
improvement associated with the interface. That is true even though the 
ninth Georgia-Pacific factor discusses advantages of the patent over old 
modes and devices. It is very unlikely that this factor is given much weight 
in most damages calculations. The Georgia-Pacific test “overloads the jury 
with factors to consider that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even 
contradictory.”152  The result is that for years, patentees could try to obscure 
apportionment principles by using compatibility value arguments to push 
for a high royalty.  
Thankfully, the Federal Circuit has just recently issued two decisions 
excluding innovation value from reasonable royalty recoveries in the 
context of standards essential patents. In the first case, Ericsson sued D-
Link on three patents that were necessary to the 802.11(n) Wi-Fi wireless 
standard.153 Before the lawsuit, Ericsson had agreed to license these patents 
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (RAND) as part of the 
standards process.154 The jury found that D-Link infringed the three patents 
and awarded Ericsson $10 million (approximately 15 cents per infringing 
device). On appeal, D-Link argued, that the district court erred by giving the 
jury “the customary Georgia-Pacific factors.”155 According to D-Link some 
of these factors were either inapplicable or misleading because Ericsson was 
obligated to license its patents under reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms.156 Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with D-Link and found that factors 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 were not 
applicable in the RAND context or needed some modification.157  
But the Federal Circuit did not just discuss the problems with the 
Georgia-Pacific factors, the decision took a step further and instructed the 
lower court to apportion value in the RAND context based on innovation 
and compatibility values, albeit using different language.  The decision first 
noted that a standards essential patent is not always used because “it is the 
                                                 
151 Carl Shapiro & Hal Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network 
Economy, 179-82 (1999) (explaining how consumer demand is higher for products that 
operate on successful platforms). 
152 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627, 628 (2010); see also, Christopher B. 
Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent 
Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1697–98 (discussing difficulties with the fifteen factor 
test).   
153 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
154 Id. at 1209. 
155 Id. at 1229. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 1229-31. 
3-Feb-16] Horizontal Innovation 39 
best or only option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply with 
the standard.”158 In other words, the court recognized that standards 
essential patents have both innovation value and compatibility value and 
distinguished between the two. The court went on to hold that “the royalty 
for SEPs should reflect the approximate value of that technological 
contribution, not the value of its widespread adoption due to the 
standardization.”159 In other words, the court excluded compatibility value 
from the recovery. To implement this form of apportionment, the court 
concluded that jury must be told to consider the difference between the 
added value of the technological invention and the added value of that 
invention’s standardization.”160 Subsequently, in CSIRO v. Cisco, the 
Federal Circuit vacated another damages award because the district court 
had failed to ensure that jury distinguished between the value of the patents 
and the value of the standard that they covered.161 Importantly, the decision 
found that Ericsson v. D-Link’s holding was not limited to patents 
encumbered by an obligation to license on RAND terms, but also applied to 
“SEPs generally.162 
These developments represent significant progress and demonstrate 
that the courts are beginning to appreciate the distinction between 
innovation and compatibility values.  However, these reforms need to go 
further. First, in the context of reasonable royalties, the Federal Circuit 
should extend Ericsson v D-Link’s many holdings so they don’t just apply 
to standard essential patents. Neither Gillette’s razor/handle interfaces nor 
Apple’s Lightning connectors are part of any formal standard. Yet, the 
patents are certainly necessary for companies that want to make and sell 
products that operate in those environments. Therefore, the principles relied 
upon in Ericsson v. D-Link’s apply with equal force to necessary interface 
patents. Juries should be instructed to exclude compatibility value from 
reasonable royalty calculations. Moreover, if the Federal Circuit is serious 
about preventing patentees from recovering compatibility value, it needs to 
stop issuing eliminate injunctions and awarding lost profits for necessary 
interface patents. As discussed earlier, these remedies also implicitly award 
compatibility value. 
 
 
V. EPILOG: FIVE ODDLY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF TYING 
 
Up to this point, the article has discussed the problem of horizontal 
                                                 
158 Id. at 1233. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 1233. 
161 Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 2015-
1066, 2015 WL 7783669, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2015).  
162 Id. 
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innovation in the context of interface patents. From a patent perspective 
these patents don’t make sense because the public is giving something (i.e. 
a patent) for nothing (i.e. technology that is no better what we have). That 
insight helps us understand that there is a component of all interface patents 
that suffer from the same problem. Because of the remedies patent law 
provides, those patents possess compatibility value. The proposals made 
here proceeds within that general framework. That means that my proposals 
rely on patent values and take a very patent centric view of the law. 
But I would be remiss if I did not mention that companies don’t just 
patent interfaces to tie products and close platforms. There are at least four 
other commonly used tactics that accomplish the same goals. First, 
companies force ties on customers through contracts. In other words, they 
require purchasers of one product (e.g. printers) to buy the company’s other 
product (e.g. ink). Second, they redesign their products to render their 
competitors complementary products useless. Third, based on the recent 
Oracle v. Google decision, companies can now try to obtain copyright 
protection for software interfaces that help products achieve 
compatibility.163 Fourth, companies are now seeking to use the DMCA’s 
(Digital Millennium Copyright Act) anti-circumvention provisions to 
prevent competitors from making compatible products. Oddly, different 
substantive laws govern these tactics: namely patent, antitrust, traditional 
copyright and the DMCA. Not surprisingly the motivating principles 
underlying these laws, the standards they apply and the results they yield 
are all different. The following discussion gives a very brief discussion of 
each of these tactics and the law that governs them. 
 
A.  Antitrust and Contractual Tying 
 
Perhaps, the most well-known form of tying occurs when a company 
contractually obligates a customer of one product to also buy other products 
from it.  Examples include: tying salt tablets to salt machines164 and tying 
ink to printers.165 To the extent these arrangements are challenged as illegal, 
the issue is governed by antitrust law.    
Historically, the Supreme Court has condemned tying arrangements. By 
as early as 1947, the Court lumped tying together with price fixing and 
declared that such conduct was a per se violation of the antitrust laws.166 
                                                 
163 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 2887 (2015). 
164 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) 
165 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
166 Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (violations of both Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act were found).  
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The Court would subsequently say “[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any 
purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”167 However, over the 
years, the Supreme Court gradually became more accepting of tying.168 By 
1984, the Court acknowledged that not all ties were harmful saying:  
 
It is clear, however, that not every refusal to sell two products separately 
can be said to restrain competition . . . Buyers often find package sales 
attractive; a seller's decision to offer such packages can merely be an 
attempt to compete effectively -- conduct that is entirely consistent with 
the Sherman Act.169 
 
Later in Jefferson Parish, the Court took a step back from true per se 
liability, and limited liability to those situations in which: 1) the seller has 
market power over the tying product, 2) there must be a substantial threat 
that seller will acquire market power in the market for the tied product, and 
3) the tying and tied products must be distinct (i.e. not a single product).170 
This approach to tying has been labeled quasi per se liability.171 The 
practice is not strictly per se unlawful because, unlike decisions on price 
fixing, the courts inquire into market power and whether the practice 
actually prevents consumers from taking a competing product.172 The law is 
also not applying the rule of reason because plaintiffs have no serious 
obligation to establish anticompetitive effects and defendants have little 
opportunity to establish efficiencies.173 In sum, antitrust law assesses the 
enforceability of contractual ties by relying on classic antitrust 
considerations like, market power, market definition and threats to 
competition.  
                                                 
167 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). 
168 Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 518 (1969)(in dissent, Justice 
White describes many potential scenarios where the seller is merely competing in the tied 
product market and buyers are not burdened). This reversal stems from Chicago School 
theorists that argue that a firm with a monopoly in one product cannot increase its 
monopoly profits by using tying to leverage itself into a second monopoly in another 
product. See e.g. Robert A. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 372-75, 380-81 (1978); Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20-23 
(1957).  
169 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984) abrogated by 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, (2006) citing Fortner Enterprises 
v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 517-518, (1969) (WHITE, J., 
dissenting); id., at 524-525 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
170 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37-39.  
171 Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
871, 903 (2011); See Elhauge, supra note 49 at 400. 
172 Id.at 420. 
173 Id. at 400. 
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B.  Antitrust and Tech Ties 
 
Another form of tie also falls under antitrust law’s domain. Companies 
often redesign their products to make it difficult, if not impossible, for other 
company’s complementary products to work with them. The goal is to make 
it practically difficult for customers to choose anything but the companies 
own complementary products. Bohannan and Hovencamp have called this 
form of implicit tying a “tech tie.”174   
A simple example involves Green Mountain Coffee, manufacturer of 
the Keurig line of single serving coffee makers.175 After its patent on K-
Cups expired, Green Mountain redesigned its coffee makers to detect 
whether someone had inserted a Keurig’s K-Cups coffee cartridge or a 
competitor’s. If it was a competitor’s cartridge, the machine would not brew 
coffee.  There was a public outcry against the new design and several 
competitors sued Green Mountain for violating antitrust law.176  Eventually 
Green Mountain withdrew its new design.177 
Tech ties occur frequently in the technology industry. In the 90’s, 
Microsoft redesigned Windows so that it was difficult if not impossible to 
remove its browser, Microsoft Explorer.178 This tactic discouraged personal 
computer makers from including competing browsers in their computers. 
Because Microsoft was unable to justify the design changes, the courts 
eventually found that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.179   
By focusing on whether Microsoft’s new design was justified (i.e. 
somehow better that what previously existed), antitrust law has adopted a 
seemingly patent like perspective to assessing tech ties. It first asks whether 
                                                 
174 Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 104 at 320.  
175 Glenn Manishan, Antitrust, DRM & Coffee: Is It Illegal For Keurig To Lock Down 
Its Brewers? 
176 See Dan D’Ambrosio, Lawsuits claim K-Cup maker violates antitrust laws, USA 
Today (Apr. 22,. 2014) available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/22/lawsuits-claim-k-cup-maker-
violates-antitrust-laws/8028197/ (mentioning 12 consumer class actions and two lawsuits 
brought by competitors).  
177 Fred Barbash, Keurig’s K-Cup screw-up and how it K-pitulated to angry 
consumers, The Washington Post, (May 7 2015) available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/07/keurigs-k-cup-screw-
up-and-how-it-k-pitulated-wednesday-to-angry-consumers/  
178 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) Microsoft 
redesigned its Windows operating systems so that its browser, Explorer, could not be 
removed through the add/remove program utility. It also commingled Explorer code with 
Windows code.  
179 U.S v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 66-67. 
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the new design improves on the previous design. If it has, that ends the 
inquiry and there is no antitrust violation even in the presence of monopoly 
power and competitive harm.180 Interestingly, antitrust law appears to 
associate the existence of the patent with product improvement even though 
patents can cover horizontal technology.181  
If the new design is not an improvement, the analysis follows the more 
traditional antitrust analysis. Companies with market power can be found 
liable for redesigning their products to injure competition.182 But the larger 
point is that antitrust law treats contractual ties and tech ties somewhat 
differently. These discrepancies become more pronounced when we move 
to types of tying that lie in the patent and copyright regimes. 
 
C.  Copyrights and Software 
 
With its decision in Oracle v. Google, the Federal Circuit has just 
opened the door for software developers to try to tie products together using 
traditional copyright law.183 The primary issue in the case was whether 
Oracle could protect critical parts of Java’s application programming 
interfaces (“API)”) using traditional copyright law.184 An API is, generally 
speaking, a software specification that allows programs to communicate 
with each other. 
By the time Google began to create its own Android operating system 
for mobile devices, Java was already ubiquitous. Google sought to make 
Android OS Java compatible so that it would be able to run smoothly on the 
many websites that used Java. While Google wrote its own code to 
                                                 
180 See Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d at 999-
1000 (9th Cir. 2010)(product improvement by itself does not violate Section 2, even if it is 
performed by a monopolist and harms competitors as a result); In re Apple iPod iTunes 
Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that when there is a 
genuine improvement, “the Court may not balance the benefits or worth of [the new 
design] against its anticompetitive effects”).  Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 776a at 285-86 (3d 
ed. 2006) (“At the very least, as all courts recognize, product improvement without more is 
protected and beyond antitrust challenge.”). 
181 Allied Orthopedic Appliances, 592 F.3d at 1000-01 (the existence of a patent 
covering the “new product design is some evidence that the change is an improvement over 
previous design.”). 
182 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (antitrust 
liability imposed for redesigning Biopty gun to prevent the use of competing replacement 
needles); U.S v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 64 (Because Microsoft was unable to justify 
the design changes, the courts eventually found that Microsoft had violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
183 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 2887 (2015).  
184 Id at 1361 (specifically, the court focused on the declaring code and structure of the 
API packages). 
44 Horizontal Innovation [3-Feb-16 
implement Java185, Google did copy the declaring code of 37 different Java 
packages as well as the structure sequence and organization of that code.186 
Google justified its actions by saying that it needed to copy those portions 
of Java to achieve compatibility. For many, Google’s arguments seemed 
well founded.187  
To begin with, U.S.C. § 102(b) explicitly limits copyright protection: 
“[i]n no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied” in a protected work. Additionally, numerous earlier decisions 
had held that copyright protection cannot extend to functional elements.188   
However, the Federal Circuit rejected these arguments by identifying 
different ways to achieve the functions at issue. First, the court said that 
Google could have made its own different declaring code to achieve the 
same result it had achieved with Android.189  Second, the Court pointed out 
that Sun/Oracle also had different choices when creating Java.190 Given 
these different choices, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Oracle was not 
seeking to protect the underlying idea, just the expressions Java used.191 
While the decision is undoubtedly correct about the different ways to 
perform the vast majority of Java’s functions, there is one function the court 
ignores, achieving compatibility.  Apparently, the Federal Circuit does not 
believe that achieving compatibility is a recognizable function. 
This omission suggests that companies can design their products to 
require certain software handshaking protocols and then use copyright law 
to protect those protocols.192 After all competitors can clearly write different 
                                                 
185 Id. at 1360 (Google spent two and a half years ... to write from scratch all of the 
implementing code.”) 
186 Id. at 1350-51. 
187 See Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Grant of 
Petition, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc. No.14-410 (S.Ct. Nov. 7, 2014).  
188 Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 
1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding that methods of 
operation embodied in programs are excluded from protection); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that “the functional 
requirements for [achieving] compatibility” are aspects of computer programs that “are not 
protected by copyright” because these interface procedures are excluded from protection 
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).); Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 
693, 709-710  (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the functional requirements for achieving 
interoperability were not protectable by copyright law).  
189 Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361. Of course such code would not be Java compatible. 
190 Id. at  
191  
192 Pamela Samuelson, Are APIs Patent or Copyright Subject Matter?, Patently-O 
(May 12, 2014) available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/05/copyright-subject-
matter.html (suggesting that the if Oracle v. Google case is to be believed, APIs have 
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software that performs the same handshaking function, albeit without 
achieving compatibility. In effect, this allows for a kind of software tie.193  
However, unlike the way antitrust law deals with tying, copyright law will 
assess the legality of such software ties by either verifying that various 
ways of handshaking are possible (following Oracle v. Google) or declaring 
that such software covers unprotectable functions (following earlier 
precedent).194  
 
D.  The DCMA and Anti-circumvention 
 
Companies like John Deere and General Motors recently attempted to 
use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) anti-circumvention 
provisions to tie products to their tractors and cars. Passed in 1998, the 
DMCA includes provisions that focus on those who provide technology for 
overcoming technological protection measure. Specifically, § 1201(a)(1)(A) 
states: “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright] 
title.”195 In effect, the statute bars breaking into any copyrighted work that 
the copyright owner has purposefully locked up using technology.”196 
To prevent these restrictions from threatening traditionally protected 
uses,197 the DCMA contained a number of exemptions.198 It also required 
the Librarian of Congress to periodically conduct a rulemaking proceeding 
to identify further classes of exemptions.199 During the most recent such 
proceeding, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) proposed an 
exemption for “Vehicle Software – Diagnosis Repair, or Modification.”200 
The purpose of such an exemption is to allow owners to freely personalize, 
                                                                                                                            
migrated back into copyright’s realm big time) 
193 There is precedent for such attempts. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Jan. 6, 1993), Sega designed its 
videogame console so that it would not operate unless the video cartridge contained 
specific software.   
194 See supra note 188. 
195 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
196 Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 361-62 (2008) 
197 For example, the fair use doctrine has long afforded access to copyrighted works 
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modify, or otherwise improve their cars.201  
John Deere and General Motors, among others, objected to this 
exemption.202 John Deere’s comments are fairly representative of the larger 
industry response. It argued that such an exemption “will make it possible 
for pirates, third-party software developers, and less innovative competitors 
to free-ride off the creativity, unique expression and ingenuity of vehicle 
software designed by leading vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers.”203 
Of course companies that make complementary products need to 
circumvent the vehicle’s technological protection measures to make their 
products compatible with the vehicle’s software. In its reply, EFF identified 
a number of such complementary products. They include new products for 
“repair, diagnosis and modification, such as scan tools that compete with 
those of the manufacturer, custom dash computers, and apps, and tools to 
reprogram an ECU [engine control unit] to accept an aftermarket part.”204  
In late 2015, the Librarian of Congress issued its decision and adopted an 
exemption substantially along the lines that the EFF requested.205  The 
result is that, for the most party, others may circumvent the technological 
protection measures that automobile manufacturers use to prevent 
modifications to their automobile software. 
But while the Librarian of Congress was focused on the narrow question 
of whether a particular technology protection measure could be 
circumvented, the larger question is one of tying. The automobile industry 
sought to use the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions to prevent 
potential competitors from making products that work with their vehicles. If 
they had succeeded, customers will only be able to buy such products from 
the original manufacturer (e.g. John Deere itself) or their licensees. Put 
more concretely, a company like GM will be able to tie complementary 
goods like a new exhaust to the sale of the original car by virtue of the 
technological protection measures it placed in the original car.206 The 
success or failure of these tying attempts depended on whether the 
exemption was approved.  
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Approval of an anti-circumvention exemption is based on five factors. 
They are: (1) the availability for use of copyrighted works, (2) the 
availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and 
educational purposes; (3) the impact that the prohibition on the 
circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has 
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, (4) scholarship, or 
research; the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the 
market for or value of copyrighted works; and (5) such other factors as the 
Librarian considers appropriate.207  
Of course these factors are quite different than the ones patent, antitrust 
law and traditional copyright law use to assess the different forms of tying 
that fall within their respective jurisdictions. But these tactics all seek to 
accomplish the same result.  They seek to force consumers that buy one 
product to purchase a second complementary product. Now in general, the 
legality of a particular tactic should not turn on which legal/technical 
approach a company uses.  
We would expect that antitrust theory is best suited to provide principles 
to apply across all these forms of tying. But antitrust law suffers from two 
problems. First, antitrust scholars cannot agree when tying facilitates or 
harms competition.  Second, even if a consensus develops, its not clear that 
the law could implement those principles cost-efficiently or effectively. 
Regardless, this article does not attempt to step into antitrust law’s tying 
morass. Rather, I merely explain how patent law should address the 
interface patent problem using patent values. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
By studying the motivations for patenting horizontal innovation, this 
Article is able to identify two distinct types of values that interface patents 
possess, compatibility value and innovation value. Using three real world 
examples, the article explains why awarding compatibility value is 
inconsistent with the goals of the patent system. Accordingly, this Article 
proposes changes to the remedies patent law awards. Specifically, I 
recommend that courts no longer issues injunctions or award lost profits for 
necessary interface patents. Instead, they should only award reasonable 
royalties that are calibrated to the magnitude of the patent’s contribution 
while specifically excluding compatibility value. 
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